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FUNNY MONEY:
HOW FEDERAL EDUCATION FUNDING HURTS
POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS
by CASSANDRA JONES HA VARD*
[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
-Former United States Chief Justice Earl Warren l
INTRODUCTION

Neither race nor class alone can predict educational achievement. However, in
America, disparities in funding for education may be an impediment to educational
opportunity for disadvantaged youth. 2 At the crux of the Nation's achievement gap
among minority children is the question of the how states should allocate federal
education funds, and how local school districts should use those monies. 3 Educators
have long recognized that the socioeconomic circumstances of many public school
students present great educational challenges. 4 Since 1965, Congress has authorized

* B.A., Bennett College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law. The author thanks Erika Wood for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and
Genevieve Loutinsky and members of the Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review for their editorial
assistance.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. Adequate school funding can result in achieving lower student-ta-teacher ratios, obtaining better
qualified teachers, and acquiring more school materials and supplies, yet an achievement gap still exists
between students of different races. Sam Dillon, Schools Slow in Closing Gaps Between Races, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at AI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo6/11120/education/
20gap.html ?sq=sam%20dillon%20gaps%20between%20races&st=nyt&scp= 1&pagewanted=all.
The
2005 National Assessment of Academic Progress found that nineteen percent of white students in the
eighth grade tested below "basic" proficiency in reading, compared with forty-nine percent of black
students. Id. at A18. Fifty-nine percent of black students tested below basic proficiency in eighth grade
math compared with twenty-one percent of white students. Id. There is a correlation between the quality
of schooling and future economic success. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Does School Quality
Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States, 100 J. POL.
EcON. 1,1-2 (1992) (showing the positive correlation between "school quality and earnings").
3. The issue of inter-district funding first came to the attention of the Supreme Court in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and the issue of funding equity in
public schools generally has been widely litigated since public school desegregation following Brown.
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989) (detailing testimony
alleging that the unequal state-wide funding system in Kentucky affected the quality of education and
school performance); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Okla. 1987)
(determining that equal funds for students are not required for the federal constitution).
4. See Lauren E. Winters, Colorblind Context: Redefining Race-Conscious Policies in Primary and
[123]
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the use of federal funds by local school districts to remedy the achievement gap. 5
The Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 (ESEA)6 is now the much
debated No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).7 Title 18 is the largest federal program
assisting elementary and secondary schools; it contains the key accountability
provisions under NCLB.9 The declared objective of federal education funding is to
focus more attention on high-poverty schools.1O ESEA started the federal
government's commitment to providing American children equal access to highquality public education." NCLB represents a federal policy of improved
accountability and transparency in education. 12 It is controversial not only because
it has separated the federal government from the goal of equal educational
opportunity but it has created funding inequities that state and local education
Secondary Education, 86 OR. L. REV. 679, 720 (2007) (noting that household income is a predictor of

student achievement).
5. In its landmark Brown decision, the Court struck down the separate but equal doctrine in
education and paved the way for educational equality. 347 U.S. at 495. As the Brown Court said,
"[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." [d. at 493. Fiftyfive years later, educational opportunity remains hampered by funding disparities between low-poverty
and high-poverty public school districts. See KEvIN CAREY, THE EDUC. TRUST, THE fuNDING GAP
2004: MANY STATES STILL SHORTCHANGE LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS 5 (2004), available
at http://www2.edtrust.org!NRIrdonlyres/30B3ClB3-3DA6-4809AFB92DAACFl lCF88/01
funding2004.pdf (demonstrating the gap in per-student funding between highest and lowest-poverty
districts).
6. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. (79
Stat.) 29 (now codified at 20 U.S.c. §§ 6301-7941 (2002)).
7. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20
U.S.c. §§ 6301-7941 (2004)).
8. 20 U.S.c. §§ 6301-6578 (2001).
9. [d. § 6311(b); see also infra notes 27-52 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
govemment's role in implementation and oversight of ESEA funds).
10. ESEA § 201, supra note 7, at 29 (stating in Title n "Declaration of Policy" that it is to be "the
policy of the United States to provide financial assistance ... to local educational agencies servicing
areas with concentrations of children from low-income families."). Title I of the ESEA is a set of
programs that distribute funding to schools and school districts with a high percentage of students from
low-income families. [d. § 203 at 31. Title I of the ESEA is a set of programs to distribute funding to
schools and school districts with a high percentage of students from low-income families. /d. When
enacted, NCLB listed as its objective: "[t]o close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility,
and choice, so that no child is left behind." NCLB, supra note 8, 115 Stat. at 1425.
II. See Congo Budget Office Study, The Federal Role in Improving Elementary and Secondary
Education, 2, 20 (May 1993) (noting that the largest federal program promoting equal educational
opportunity is Chapter I of Title I of the ESEA). Unlike NCLB, ESEA does not provide a national
curriculum, leaving local school boards the authority to determine the specific curriculum. [d. at 24. The
federal government pledged that "no provision of the ESEA should be construed to authorize any
department, agency, office, or employee of the United States to exercise any control over the curriculum
... of any education institution, school, or school system." /d.
12. See NCLB, supra note 8, at 1439-40 (emphasizing academic assessments, accountability systems
and other measures to ensure NCLB's goals are met).
The purpose of this title is to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant
opportunity to obtain a high-quality education ... [t]his purpose can be accomplished by ..
. ensuring that high-quality academic assessments, accountability systems, teacher
preparation and training, curriculum, and instructional materials are aligned with
challenging State academic standards.
/d.
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boards must now resolve.13 Through the receipt of the federal aid, these laws
require state and local education policymakers to level the funding inequities. 14
Title I money is federal funding appropriated to local schools with large
concentrations of economically disadvantaged students. IS The legislative goal of
federal education funding is to ensure equal education for all children. 16 Schools
and districts with large concentrations of underprivileged students are eligible to
receive the federal funding; and indeed, that funding plays a major role in school
finance. 17
Because it allows for discretion in the allocation of federal monies, Title I
federal funding regime has become a source of inequity in educational services for
students in high-poverty schools. 18 This inequity is generated by an inherent
13. See Marguerite Roza, What if We Closed the Title I Comparability Loophole?, in ENSURING
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 9, 63 (2008) (noting that despite Title I funding to promote
equity in schools, investigations show that school districts still routinely spend a larger share of state and
local funds on schools with fewer low-income students); see also discussion infra Parts II, III
(elaborating on the federal government's role in Title I and the further funding equities that remain or
are exacerbated by the legislation).
14. See id. at 13, 61 (discussing Title 1's comparability provisions that require school districts to
equalize education services purchased with state and local funds before Title lone funds are disbursed to
them); see also Rachel F. Moran, The Politics Of Discretion: Federal Intervention In Bilingual
Education, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1259 (1988) (stating that the ESEA's objectives at its inception
included equalizing educational and economic opportunity for disadvantaged students and the
eradication of racial discrimination). Title I funds are designed to bridge the achievement gap that
economically disadvantaged children face by providing more instruction and support. NCLB § 1001,
supra note 8, liS Stat. at 1439. NCLB represents one of eight re-authorizations in thirty years. It
amends Title I of the ESEA and allows states more flexibility in how the funds will be used. See
generally Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using The Courts To Influence The Implementation Of No Child
Left Behind, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 781 (2006) (discussing NCLB's implementation issues and the
role of the courts in addressing statutory conflicts). NCLB funds are commonly referred to as "Title f'
money. Michael Janofsky, Federal Spending Increases. But More Schools Will Get Less Money for
Low-Income Students, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at AI. Unlike the NCLB which places performance
requirements on all public schools, ESEA as originally enacted, had as its sole objective, the funding of
educational programs that would benefit poor children. ESEA § 201, supra note 7, at 29.
IS. Congo Budget Office Study, supra note 11, at 11. One-third of the federal expenditures for
grades K-12 comes from Title I funds. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 10 FACfS ABOUT K-12 EDUC. fuNDING I,
2 (2005) available at http://www.ed.gov/aboutloverview/fedllOfactsllOfacts.pdf.
16. NCLB § 1001, supra note 8, liS Stat. at 1439 (stating that "the purpose of this title is to ensure
that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education"); see
also 20 U.S.c. § 6311(b)(I)(B) (codifying the rule that under NCLB, states are required to hold Title I
students accountable for achieving "the same academic standards that the State applies to all schools and
children in the State.").
17. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note IS, at 6 (noting that the President's FY 2006 proposed
budget included that "Title I, the largest federal K-12 program, would provide over $13 billion to local
districts to improve the academic achievement of children in high-poverty schools."). NCLB was
designed to address the widening disparities in achievement. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3). The Act's Statement
of Purpose includes "[c]losing the achievement gap between high and low-performing children,
especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers." Id. By basing federal funding on school
accountability standards, schools are held responsible for failing students. See also Philip T.K. Daniel,
No Child Left Behind: The Balm of Gilead Has Arrived in American Education, 206 EDUC. L. REp. 791,
794 (2006) (indicating that individual schools which do not meet "state adequate yearly progress
targets" risk losing federal funding).
18. See Roza, supra note 13, at 61 (pointing out that school districts still give more funding to
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conflict between two fiscal accountability functions-the "comparability" function
of Title I and the "supplement not supplant" provision of Title 111. 19 State boards of
education and local school districts have the authority and discretion under federal
law to use the federal Title I funds to balance their own funding systems. 20
Supplanting federal monies occurs when a state or local school district uses the
federal money to provide services that the school district was required to make
available under state or local laws, or other federallaws. 21
The use of federal monies to balance local funding needs should occur only
when there is "comparability," or when school districts provide comparable
services in Title I and in non-Title I schools.22 Comparability has been
misinterpreted and misapplied within the other fiscal accountability measure of
"'supplement not supplant.'''23 Two events make monitoring program compliance
difficult. First, because money is fungible, there are problems determining whether
local school districts allocate federal program funding in place of local funding that
was unavailable. Second, there are problems determining whether there is a mix of
local and federal funds for district-wide programs. When fiscal accountability
cannot be established, the federal education funding requirements may actually
worsen educational opportunity at the local leve1. 24 Not only do school districts
sometimes fail to make funding choices in ways that will benefit economically
challenged student populations, but the U.S. Department of Education is also a

schools with a lower number of low-income students); see also Daniel, supra note 17, at 814 n.2S
(noting that Title I funds school refonn by broadly "supporting programs designed to improve
educational opportunities of low-income and disadvantaged students").
19. See 20 U.S.c. § 6321(b) ("A State educational agency or local educational agency shall use
Federal funds ... only to supplement the funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be
made available from non-Federal sources."); 20 U.S.c. § 6321(c) ("[Allocal agency may receive funds.
. . only if State and local funds will be used to provide services that, taken as a whole, are at least
comparable to services in school that are not receiving funds under this part.").
20. See id. ("A state educational agency or local educational agency shall use Federal funds received
under [Title 1] only to supplement the funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made
available from non-Federal sources."). The "supplement not supplant" (SNS) provision prohibits school
districts from using Title 1 funds for activities that it would have carried out in the absence of Title I
funds. [d.; see discussion infra Part II (analyzing the historical background of the ESEA and the federal
government's role in public school education).
21. NEV. DEP'T OF EDUC., SUPPLEMENT/SUPPLANT REQUIREMENT FOR FEDERAL FuNDS 1 (2006),
http://epage.doe.nv.gov/epage/documentview.asp?docid=502(1astvisitedNov.11, 2009); TENN. DEP'T
OF EDUC., SUPPLEMENT/ SUPPLANT REQUIREMENT FOR NCLB FuNDS 1, http://www.state.tn.us/
educationlfedprogldoclTNSupplementNotSupplant.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
22. Most local school districts have determined "comparability" to require the allocation of more
staff to high-poverty schools. See MARGUERITE ROZA, What If We Closed the Title [ Comparability
Loophole, in ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 59, 73 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(200S), http://www.americanprogress.orglissues/2ooS/06/pdf/comparability_partJ.pdf (last visited Nov.
10,2009) ("Some districts are ... using staffing ratios to document compliance on comparability."). The
original intent of "comparability" was to force districts to equalize per pupil dollar expenditures. [d.
23. See id. at 63 (noting that state and local funds are not equitably distributed between Title I and
non-Title I schools for the basic instruction of poor students prior to the allocation of federal funds).
24. See Ctr. for Am. Progress, Ensuring Equal Opportunity in Public Educ., http://www.
americanprogress.orglissueS/200S/06/comparability.html (last visited Nov. 10,2009) (commenting that a
loophole in the comparability provision allowing for the inequitable distribution of local funds to
continue magnifies existing inequality in education at the local level).
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passive enforcer of the statutory mandate. 25 Consequently, local school authorities
implement Title I programs with variable levels of success. 26 Improving the success
rate of local programs should be second only to ensuring that low-income and
minority students receive the federal monies that are allocated for them.
Part I of this Article discusses the background and history of Title I, and
reviews the debates surrounding the statute's enactment. The Section ends by
arguing that problems with the statute's contorted history and weak initial
implementation have contributed greatly to ineffective enforcement and inequitable
funding outcomes.
Part II discusses the appropriate role for federal government in local school
funding. It describes federal funding for education as cooperative federalism, and
argues that the federalist assertion that education is solely a local issue is mistaken
by analyzing the characteristics and types of programs and funding historically and
currently available for state and local education programs. Part II concludes by
defining the role that federal government should play in eradicating improper
funding allocations at the state and local level. Comparability is the most critical
issue to examine if funding inequities are to be eradicated. Part III argues that there
should be changes in both the ideology and the legislative schemes that encompass
Title I. Specifically, Title I should be more "child-centered" and the funding
formula should be keyed to the "Title I child."
This will require more directed monitoring of comparability under Title I and
the "supplement not supplant" conditions under Title III. State and local school
districts should be restricted from using money for budgeting needs unrelated to the
Title I child. 27 When educational funding functions equitably, educators become
better able to improve the delivery of education and narrow the achievement gap
that minority and high-poverty students encounter.

25. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS: FISCAL OVERSIGHT OF TITLE
I COULD BE iMPROVED 4 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03377.pdf (finding
limitations in the Department of Education's efforts to guide, monitor, and enforce the fiscal
accountability provisions) [hereinafter GAO TrrLE I FuNDINGl.
26. See Michael Casserly, Executive Dir. of the Council of the Great City Schools, Testimony on
Successful Implementation of Title I before the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions of the
U.S. Senate 3 (Sept. 10,2002), available at http://www.cgcs.orglpdfsrrestimony9-1O-02.pdf(indicating
that implementation of Title I has been successful in the nation's urban school districts); Superfine,
supra note 15, at 791-97 (discussing how the lack of sufficient fiscal and technical capacities have
hindered the ability of states, districts and schools to implement NCLB mandates regarding testing and
accountability).
27. The change would also amend Title I's "comparability loophole," which currently contributes to
wide differentials in teachers' salaries. See Cynthia G. Brown, Public Education From Pre·
Kinderganen Through High School, 3S HUM. RTS. 20, 21 (2008) ("[Title I] contains a loophole that
allows differences in teachers' salaries to be excluded from calculations and consequently supports the
longstanding and unequal ways that local and state funds have been distributed by districts.").
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I. ESEA AS COMPROMISE LEGIS LA TION
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education sparked
national debate and discussion about the quality of education that black and poor
children received in the public schools. 28 With passage of the ESEA, the federal
government focused on the connection between poverty and economic opportunity,
and the needs of educationally deprived children for the fust time in the country's
history.29 This Section explains the historical foundation of the ESEA and provides
background information for a later discussion that explores how Title I's current
enforcement impedes the achievement of educational equity.
The ESEA was one of the first times that the federal government was directly
involved in public school education. 3o As a part of President Johnson's "War on
Poverty," the ESEA was envisioned as reform legislation that would bridge the gap
between poverty and economic opportunity.31 The initial vision and the actual
compromises that led to the statute's passage present a contorted history that
includes compromises which affect its efficacy even today.32
Congress passed the ESEA of 1965 after much compromise. 33 Title I was the
most prominent feature of ESEA because its funding initiatives brought federal
intervention to education policy. Title I's funding mechanism became an effective
way for the federal government to exercise control over an area that had historically
been left to the states. 34 ESEA represented a compromise between those opposed to

28. See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Special Message to the Congress: "Toward
Full Educational Opportunity" (Jan. 12, 1965), available at hnp:/Iwww.presidency.ucsb.edulwsziindex.
php?pid=27448&st=anti-poverty&stl=. President Johnson, a former teacher, made educational
opportunities for poor, black, and disadvantaged students a critical part of his anti-poverty campaign.
When he signed the legislation into law, he gave his perspective on poverty and education: "Poverty has
many roots, but the taproot is ignorance .... UJust as ignorance breeds poverty, poverty too often
breeds ignorance in the next generation." Id.
29. ESEA, § 1.
30. See Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is It An Unfunded Mandate Or A
Promotion Of Federal Educational Ideals?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 197 (2008) (noting that the federal
government became the largest sponsor of educational reform during the 1960s with the passage of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ESEA in 1965, exercising a power that had been used
sparingly until that era).
31. See Mariana Kihuen, Leaving No Child Behind: A Civil Right, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y
& L. 113, 115 (2009) ("Congress passed the ESEA as part of President Johnson's "War on Poverty" to
help low-income students obtain educational parity.").
32. See infra text accompanying notes 51-61 (detailing some of the many arguments made in either
support of or against the ESEA and its practical operation, including the lack of government oversight).
33. See NATIONAL EDUCATION ASS'N, ESEA: IT'S TIME FOR A CHANGE! NEA's POSITIVE AGENDA
FOR THE ESEA REAUTHORIZATION app. 1 (2006), hnp:/Iwww.ieanea.org/locaVaeaw/assets/posagenda
.pdf (noting that ESEA was based on a major compromise concerning federal aid to private and
parochial schools).
34. See David Nash, Improving No Child Left Behind: Achieving Excellence And Equity In
Partnership With The States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 239, 245 (2002) (noting that Title I funds were easy
to administer and encouraged research and experimentation into new strategies that could address
certain needs of disadvantaged students).
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federal involvement in education and those concerned about the educational
opportunities afforded to black children. Conservatives wanted to avoid federal
governmental involvement in an area traditionally left to the states. 35 They argued
for fiscal restraint and limited federal intervention. 36 Proponents of local control
over education also argued that limited federal intervention works better because
local officials are more versed in the local perspectives and therefore able to create
effective solutions. 37
Opponents of local control argued that there was a need for uniformity.38 They
contended that individual school districts and even some states did not have the
financial capacity to provide the educational opportunities needed. 39 This faction
sought to structure formulae for the allocation of federal education funding in a
more equitable way.40 The strong anti-centralization bias and the concern that
parochial schools should receive aid were among the core concerns that thwarted
these efforts.41 As a result, the substantive intervention of the federal government in
local Title I expenditures was actually prec1uded. 42 The initial Title I funding
scheme was in effect two-dimensional, as evidenced in the legislation-it provided

35. See National Education Association, supra note 33, app. I at 2 (noting that conservatives would
have blocked money from the federal education program, and thus would have shifted both money and
power to the state level).
36. President Eisenhower surprised many citizens when he intervened in education on the federal
level. See Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning The Architecture Of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 227, 267-70 (1996) (noting that the
1957 National Defense Education Act marked a significant change in the federal government's role in
educational funding).
37. See Gail L. Sunderman, The Federal Role in Education: From the Reagan to the Obama
Administration, 24 VOICES IN URBAN EDU. 6,6 (2009), available at http://www.annenberginstitute.org/
VUElpdfIVUE24_Sunderman.pdf (observing that conservative federalists prefer that local governments
select how to spend funds).
3S. See id. at 7 (noting that these education policies sought to address policies that were neglected
at the state level and equalize educational opportunities).
39. See generally James W. Guthrie, A Political Case History: Passage of the ESEA, 49 THE PHI
DELTA KApPAN 302, 304 (196S) (describing how the Title I formula was a way to distribute more
federal funds to less wealthy states).
40. Peter Zamora, In Recognition of the Special Educational Needs of Low-Income Families?:
Ideological Discord and Its Effects upon Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts of
1965 and 2001, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 413, 423 (2003) [hereinafter Ideological Discord].
41. Id. at 417; see DAVID P. SMOLE, CONGo REsEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
SCHOOL CHOICE UNDER THE ESEA: PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS 5 (200S), available at
https://www.policy
archi ve.orglbitstreamlhandlell 0207/19227 IRL33506_200S0 122. pdf?sequence=2
(discussing
anticentralization bias); id. at 5 n.7 (discussing concern that some groups such as National Education
Association opposed legislation that would permit aid to parochial schools).
42. SMOLE, supra note 42, at 5 n.7. This early philosophy contrasts with the accountability
provisions of NCLB, which bar the receipt of federal funds by schools that do not meet its standards. 20
U.S.C. § 6311 (2006). The early failures of Congress to intervene in education are tied to the purposes of
the federal aid. See Carl F. Kaestle, Federal Aid to Education Since World War ll: Purposes and Politics
in THE FuTURE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION 15 (Center on
Education Policy ed., 2000) ("[O]pponents of federal intervention in local public schools argued that it
violated a valuable tradition.").
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federal funding and did not disturb basic educational infrastructure. 43
Title I's specific goal was equity in education. 44 The statute financed remedial
education programs. 45 The opposing factions shared recognition that providing
targeted funds to schools could help to break the cycle of group poverty for
economically deprived students. 46 ESEA was structured to provide financial aid to
local school districts through block grants that involved guidelines for program
expenditures. The question of how the federal aid was to be delivered to
disadvantaged students was not perceived to be as significant as the identified need
to improve basic literacy and mathematical skills.47 The aid delivery system
focused on having local school districts accurately identify their number of
disadvantaged students. 48 Schools were free to choose their assessment methods for
identifying and improving math and literacy instruction. 49 This delegation of
responsibility to local school districts allowed them autonomy to implement
programs, and encouraged research and development on the strategies needed to
reach disadvantaged students. 5o Generally, federal money was used to hire teacher's
aides and to create remedial "pull-out" classes for disadvantaged students. 51 Despite
this autonomy however, curriculum measures instituted on the whole did not raise
achievement among the targeted students.52

43. Ideological Discord, supra note 40, at 419.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Zamora argues that Title I's implementation is flawed in part because its foundations are
unsupported, if not fallacious. Those assumptions are:
(I) poverty was an inherent educational disadvantage; (2) educational underachievement
had negati ve economic consequences; (3) this cycle could be broken through the targeted
use of limited federal funds to partially counterbalance operational funding disparities
between schools and income disparities in the home; (4) the curricula, pedagogy, and local
expertise employed in local schools at the time were all potentially effective in improving
achievement among the "educationally deprived;" (5) the needs of local school districts are
coextensive with the needs of low-achieving students; and (6) equalizing educational
opportunity would create increased economic opportunity.
Id. at 419-20.
47. See David K. Cohen & Susan L. Moffitt, Title I: Politics, Povery, [sic] and Knowledge in THE
FuTuRE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 42, at 78 ("In
the 1960s it was reasonable to believe that added conventional educational resources, purchased with
federal dollars, would improve education for poor children and lead them out of poverty.").
48. Nash, supra note 36, at 245.
49. Id.; see also H.R. REp. No. 103-425, at 268 (1994) (finding that the "[u]se of low-level tests
that are not aligned with schools' curricula" is inadequate in identifying information about children's
achievement and progress).
50. See Nash, supra note 48, at 245 (noting that Title I funds were easy to administer and
encouraged research and experimentation into new strategies that could address certain needs of
disadvantaged students). BlIt see Phyllis McClure, The History oj Educational Comparability in Title I
oJ the Elementary and Secondary Education Act oj 1965, in ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PuBLIC
EDUCATION 9, 13 (2008) (criticizing Title I federal guidelines for allowing school districts to go on
spending sprees with little federal interference).
51. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives oJ The No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
932, 937 (2004).
52. Id. at 938; see Daniel J. Losen, Silent Segregation in Our Nation's Schools, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
REV. 517, 517-18 (1999) (critiquing the practice of ability-grouping as harmful and often a cause of
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To the extent that Title I was a compromise on the issue whether the federal
government should be involved in education policy, it was successfu1. 53 As the
failures of the country's education system became more apparent, Title I became
subject to intense criticism. 54 Evaluation of the program's effectiveness moved
from a critique of its political goals to a question of whether it had in fact closed the
achievement gap for poor children. 55

II. TITLE I's ENFORCEMENT HISTORY 56
The enforcement history of Title I has three distinct phases. 57 The first phase,
though initially characterized by weak federal guidelines, leniency, and abuse, was
later marked by strong federal guidelines and the establishment of comparability
requirements. 58 The second phase was an era of deregulation. Finally, the third and
current phase includes the NCLB requirements and issues surrounding fiscal
comparability. Each phase is described briefly below.
A. Phase One

Title I gave state and local school districts wide discretion in determining how
to meet the statute's goals and objectives. 59 As a whole, Title I necessitates federallocal cooperation. 60 Because the ESEA was a companion statute to the Civil Rights

lower-level standards of educational programming).
53. See McClure, supra note 50, at 12-13 (discussing the dispute over the use of Title I funds
between traditionalists and those advocates who wanted to change the education establishment).
Generally, the traditionalists believed that federal guideline restrictions on state and local discretion to
spend Title I funding should be removed. !d. at 13. Advocates on the other side wanted to concentrate
funds on a limited number of students and certain project areas, and approved other specific proposals of
funding. ld.
54. Ryan, supra note 51, at 937; see, e.g., MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES., Prospects:
Final Report on Student Outcomes 1,7 (1997), available at http://www.eric.ed.govIERICDocs/data/eri
cdocs2sql/content_storage_01l0000019b/80/1510ale8.pdf ("Chapter 1 [Title 1], as it was configured at
[the] time, was insufficient to close the gap in academic achievement between Chapter 1 students and
their more advantaged peers."); see also Gary Natriello & Edward L. McDill, Title l: From Funding
Mechanism to Educational Program, in HARD WORK FOR GOOD SCHOOLS: FACTS NOT FADS IN TITLE 1
REFORM 31, 33-34 (1999) (drawing correlations between Title I spending and academic achievement).
55. E.g., PuMA, supra note 54, at 7 (exemplifying this criticism). See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON
EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK 5 (1983), available at http://www.ed.gov/pubslNatAtRiskJ
risk.html (evaluating the public education system in the U.S. and concluding public education at the time
of the report faced a "rising tide of mediocrity").
56. The material in this Section borrows heavily from historical analysis and evaluative
methodology performed by Kenneth Wong. See generally Kenneth K. Wong, Federal Educational
Policy As An Anti-Poverty Strategy, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 421, 422 (2002)
(describing three phases of Title I enforcement history and the ramifications of each).
57. ld.
58. See McClure, supra note 50, at 13-14 (discussing how misuse of Title 1 funds led to
comparability).
59. See id. at 12 ('The short time for the legislation's passage through Congress was devoted
primarily to working out the details of the Title I formula ... [l]ittle consideration was given [by
Congress] to how the [Title I] money would be used once it arrived in local school districts.").
60. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case For a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a
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legislation of that era, program compliance was linked to other anti-poverty
programs. 61 In the early years, the federal government adopted a "hands-off'
approach unless outright abuse was discovered. 62 This also allowed for hundreds of
interpretations of the statute and wide variety among implementation schemes. As a
result, many of the expenditures paid for goods and services that previously had
been purchased with state and local monies. 63
The era of leniency that gave school districts almost unfettered discretion on
how funds would be spent came to an end in the late 1970s.64 Title I became more
of an evaluative program as the focus on educational achievement strengthened. 65
Initiatives during this phase focused on the quality of instruction and curriculum. 66
Comparability was also introduced as an equalizing doctrine to ensure that Title I
schools were receiving equivalent services to other schools. 67 The concern that Title
I funds were supplanting rather than supplementing local and state school funds
resulted in more stringent regulations. 68 The comparability provision was
established to end the practice of unfair school resources allocation. 69 For example,
school systems in the South, which were still segregated, were known for
supplanting their Title I funding instead of using the funding to supplement existing
sources of funding. 70
The decisions of state and local school districts to supplant state and local
expenditures with Title I funds prompted greater enforcement of Title I's

Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1653, 1674-75 (2007) (finding those who
constrained the federal role in education by requiring schools to separate regular education from Title I
supported programs, hampered Title I implementation).
61. See id. at 1673-75 (describing the federal government's historical role in education and putting
the ESEA in context with the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
62. See Lorraine M. McDonnell, No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education:
Evolution or Revolution? 80 PEABODY J. OF EDUe. 19,23 (2005) ("An ambiguous legislative mandate
meant that in the early days of Title I, there was little congressional oversight or pressure on USOE
(now the U.S. Department of Education) to enforce targeting procedures that would have ensured the
program had a clear categorical purpose.").
63. See id. ("A comparability requirement, eventually incorporated into the statute, was designed to
ensure that Title I funds for educationally disadvantaged students were used in addition too-not in lieu
of-state and local funds.").
64. McClure, supra note 50, at 20.
65. See McDonnell, supra note 62, at 25 ("[Tlhe terms of the national discourse shifted from
educational opportunity and equity to educational excellence."); see also id. ("ESEA contained
unprecedented requirements for systematic evaluation of policy outcomes .... ").
66. See McClure, supra note 50, at 15 ('The instructional and ancillary services provided with State
and local funds for children in project areas should be comparable to those provided for children in the
non-project areas, particularly with respect to class size, special services, and the number and variety of
personnel.") (quoting U.S. Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II, Revised eritera for the
Approval of Title I ESEA, Applications from Local Educational Agencies).
67. Id. at 16.
68. The Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, issued a June
1968 program guide that declared the practice of supplanting a violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Id. at 15.
69. See McDonnell, supra note 62, at 23 ("A comparability requirement ... was designed to ensure
that Title I funds for educationally dis-advantaged students were used in addition to - not in lieu of state and local funds.").
70. McClure, supra note 50, at 14.

Fall 2009]

FUNNY MONEY

133

comparability rules through the comparability provision and the "supplement, not
supplant" regulations. 71 The first phase of Title I, when viewed as a governmental
program with a focused response, can be described as "intergovernmental
accommodation" with laissez-faire operational methods.72
Although the program had grown in size, absent from the implementation of
the ESEA was a "clear definition of what constituted program effectiveness [so
therefore] evidence of its positive effects on students were elusive. The
implementation of the program became fragmented, partly because ESEA was
enforced to varying degrees, and partly because during this phase regulation
emphasized 'fiscal accountability, not programmatic substance."'73 For the most
part, decisions about the substance of educational programming were left to local
districts and schools. 74 By the end of the first phase of Title I, ESEA, involved a
large number of discrete, uncoordinated programs. 75
B. Phase Two

The second phase of Title I can be characterized as the time to reduce
"[f]ragmentation" and the beginning of standards-based reforms. 76 The Reagan
Administration determined that the better strategy and reform measure was for
schools with concentrations of poor children to become more accountable. 77
Reviewing the program from a deregulation perspective, the Reagan administration
attributed the statute's ineffectiveness to an absence of national priorities. 78 The
opposition to the continued re-authorization of ESEA was concerned that its
duplicative programs failed to focus on the most pressing issues. 79
Deregulation also impacted the enforcement of ESEA. Specifically, under
Title I, deregulation resulted in a reversal of active federal monitoring and
enforcement of Title I and a relaxation of the criteria for demonstrating
comparability.80 Title I enforcement changed dramatically, requiring less-detailed

71.
72.
73.
74.

McDonnell, supra note 62, at 23 (citation omitted).
Wong, supra note 56, at 426.
McDonnell, supra note 62, at 24-25.
ld.
75. [d. at 25.
76. Wong, supra note 56, at 427.
77. See McDonnell, supra note 62, at 26-27 (supporting the propOSition that the Reagan
Administration wanted state and local governments to become more accountable for education within
their jurisdiction).
78. [d.
79. Cf Wong, supra note 56, at 429-432 (describing how "schoolwide" approaches focusing on
curriculum and instruction combated defragmentation). Some of these components included: I)
computer-based learning; 2) coordinated and integrated curriculum with supplemental; 3) extended-day
leaming.ld. at 431-32.
80. The Reagan administration actively sought to repeal Title I or to convert it into a block grant
program. See McClure, supra note 50, at 21 ("The Reagan administration orchestrated this reveal
through the enactlnent of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1928, which renamed
Title I as Chapter I .... A local educational agency was considered in compliance with the requirements
under Section 1120A(c)(2)(A) of the new Act if it had filed with the state educational agency a written
assurance that it had established and implemented: I) district-wide salary schedule; 2) policy to ensure
equivalence among schools in teachers, administrators, and other staff; and 3) policy to ensure
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reports and a general statement of compliance assurance, which the local
jurisdictions kept on file. 81 School districts were not required to ensure
comparability; instead, they were given flexibility in determining staffing, materials
and supplies. 82
The debate about the locus of decision-making was revisited during this era.
Determining critical education priorities and how to close the achievement gap for
poor children was advanced as a local issue. The planned goal of the Reagan
administration was to tum Title I into a block grant program. 83 Although this was
the planned goal, it failed.84 There was also the focus of pushing educational reform
at the state level. 85 The plan was to allow states to determine which ESEA
programs were selective with less federal intervention into how to best achieve the
federal goals. 86 This decreasing program fragmentation through program
consolidation was considered the better means to strengthen education in lowincome communities. The oft-cited reason was that it would permit those closest to
the situation to set priorities for the use of funds. 8?
The later part of Phase Two saw a decided return of both the first Bush and
Clinton administrations in setting a national agenda on elementary and secondary
education policy. Critical of the lack of uniformity in the implementation of Title I,
officials of this era emphasized the standards-based reform. 88 Policy shifted to
require more school accountability to provide higher quality education, which was
to be assessed by measuring student performance against standards-based
outcomes. 89
Congress also began to take the failure of individual states to measure student
achievement more seriously. By passing the Goals 2000: Educate America Act90 in
1994, Congress provided federal funding to support states willing to develop more
academic rigor by setting achievement standards and measuring outcomes. 91
Consistent with this change in direction at the federal level, the Department of
Education was tasked with reviewing the process for developing state standards and

equivalence among schools in the provision of curriculum, materials, and instructional supplies.").
81. Id.
82. Wong, supra note 56, at 431.
83. McClure, supra note 50, at 21.
84. Id.
85. Marshall S. Smith, Jessica Levin, and Joanne E. Cianci, Beyond a Legislative Agenda:
Education Policy Approaches of the Clinton Administration, 11 EDU. POL'y 209, 210-11 (1997).
86. Wong, supra note 56, at 427-32.
87. Id. at 431.
88. For example, in the late 1980s, the National Governors Association, chaired by then-Arkansas
Governor Bill Clinton, proposed that states would relax regulation on local school districts if the school
districts would implement "greater local accountability for effective student learning, as measured
largely by improved scores on standardized tests." McDonnell, supra note 62, at 29.
89. See McDonnell, supra note 62, at 29 (explaining that "[tlhe Clinton administration was also a
strong proponent of standards-based reforms that were premised on the notion that setting high academic
standards and then expecting schools to teach and students to learn to those standards could serve as a
potent level to improve overall educational quality").
90. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, § 20,108 Stat. 125 (1994).
91. McDonnell, supra note 62, at 29.
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assessments.92
C. Phase Three

NCLB is the third phase of Title I's history.93 This phase can be characterized
properly as the achievement outcome stage of Title I's development. 94 The
controversial federal statute expanded the role of the federal government in public
K-12 education. 95 NCLB implements academic standards, sets achievement targets,
measures student progress, and impose stringent penalties for schools that do not
fall into compliance. 96
NCLB sets detailed obligations that states and districts must comply with in
order to receive Title I funds. 97 The statue blends local autonomy with federal
objectives and requirements. NCLB requires that all students be tested for
educational achievement and requires states to make educational plans that
incorporate standardized testing, reporting of results, and accountability among
schools and districts that fail to obtain the performance standards. 98
Under NCLB, each state must submit an education plan to the U.S.
Department of Education. 99 These plans must include general academic standards loo
and specific standards for math, reading, and science. 101
Perhaps the most significant provision of NCLB is the accountability system
that states must now implement. 102 The statute requires public schools following the
plan to make "adequate yearly progress" (A YP).103 "Additionally, AYP includes a
standard of continuous and substantial [academic] improvement."I04 This
requirement means that states must ensure that all students are in compliance with
the established standards. 105 There are also specific goals for sub-groups of
minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the disabled, and students with limited

92. Gary Orfield, Introduction to Gail L. Sunderman & Jimmy Kim, INSPIRING VISION,
DISAPPOINTING RESULTS: FOUR STUDIES ON iMPLEMENTING THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND Acr I, 1
(2004) available at http://www.eric.ed.govIERICDocs/datalericdocs2sqUcontent_storage_0 1/00000 19
b/80/1 b/b8/88.pdf.
93. McDonnell, supra note 63, at 33.
94. See Orfield, supra note 92, at 4 (stating that NCLB places great emphasis on outcomes, like
student proficiency).
95. [d.
96. [d. at 1.

97. Orfield, supra note 92, at 1-2. The stated purpose of the NCLB is to ensure that "all children
have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a
minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and state academic
assessments." 20 U.S.c. § 6301.
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(I)(A)-(C).
99. [d. § 6311(a).
100. [d. § 6311(b)(l)(A).
101. [d. § 6311(b)(I)(C).
102. See id. § 6311(b)(2) ("Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State has developed and is
implementing a single, statewide State accountability system that will be effective in ensuring that all ..
. schools make adequate yearly progress.").
103. /d. §§ 631 I (b)(2)(B), (C).
104. 20 U.S.C. § 63 II(b)(2)(C)(v).
105. [d. §§ 63 11 (b)(2)(C)(iv), (v).
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English proficiency.l06 In these sub-groups, all students must meet performance
goals based on prior progress and as required by the provisions set forth in the
statute. to7 Schools that fail to make the AYP for two consecutive years are
identified as in need of "school improvement."to8 In a decided change from prior
Title I programs, NCLB provides penalties ranging from mild to severe for schools
that are out of compliance. 109
While NCLB has received praise, it has also received harsh criticism. I to
Criticisms have come from every affected constituency-state legislators, local and
state school administrators, teachers and parents. I II The criticisms have concerned
unilateralism, funding, accountability and pedagogy.112
Administrators and educators view the statutes as unilateral mandates of
assessment methods, which some educators view as unsound and inadequate
measures of student performance. 1I3 There has also been criticism from states,
alleging that funds are not available as they should be under the Act to assist them,
in attaining the required assessments.114 States having to implement the statutes
complain about the costs of implementation. 115 This criticism labels NCLB as an
"unfunded mandate."116 NCLB has also been criticized because of a lack of
authorized funds.1I7 Although Congress authorized grants that can total more than
twenty-five billion dollars by fiscal year 2007, the actual amount of funds made
available to school districts was less. lls
As for accountability, it is unclear if the authorized funds are properly used
under Title 1. 119 Whether federal officials monitor states effectively as a condition

106. Id. § 6311 (b)(2)(C)(v)(II).
107. Id. § 6311 (b )(2)(1). Additionally, NCLB requires that ninety-five percent of students in each
subgroup take the assessment. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(ii). It also requires each state to distribute the results
of the assessments by creating a report card for each school in every district, broken down by individual
subgroups.ld. § 6311(b)(lO).
lOS. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b){l)(A).
109. Id. § 6316 (b)(7)(C)(iv), § 6316(b)(S)(B); see also Orfield, supra note 92, at 7 (stating two
required sanctions for schools that are classified as "in need of improvement").
110. Orfield, supra note 92, at 2.
111. Daniel, supra note 18, at 810; Michael Heise, The 2006 Winthrop and Frances Lane Lecture:
The Unintended Legal and Policy Consequences of the No Child Left Behind Act, 86 NEB. L. REV. 119,
123-32 (2007) (describing legal and policy resistance and consequences to NCLB); James E. Ryan, The
Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932,933 (2004) (noting how
NCLB has been "condemned" by some in the media and in the education journals).
112. Heise, supra note Ill, at 123-32; Ryan, supra note Ill, at 962-63.
113. Daniel, supra note 111, at 792 (citation omitted) (providing an example that "some states are
pennitted to change how they evaluate [student] performance for accountability purposes").
114. Umpstead, supra note 30, at 223.
115. Id. at 223.
116. /d. at 194; see Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'y I, II n.65 (2008) (explaining how NCLB "operates by command," and observing
that NCLB receives much criticism for lack of funding while subjecting schools to strict sanctions if
they are unable to accomplish the goals of the statute).
1l7. Umpstead, supra note, 114 at 193-94.
liS. Id. at 201-02.
119. Daniel, supra note 18, at 798-99.
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of receiving the funds is unclear. There are also concerns that the failure of the
regulatory structure to analyze and evaluate graduation rates undercuts the entire
objective of the legislationYo Finally, to the extent that the statute focuses on
student assessment and ties performance and funding to school passage rates, there
is a question of whether teachers are using sound pedagogy and effective teaching
techniques in the classroom.
D. Current Implementation a/Title I
Title I's hallmark is the flexibility that local school official have in delivering
services to individual schools. Title I imposes upon recipients fiscal accountability
measures that are intended to police the delivery of funds and services. A concern
is that Title I funds will not be substituted for the state and local funding.
One of the fiscal requirements of Title I is "[c]omparability of services."121
Demonstrating comparability is an annual prerequisite to receiving the annual Title
I funds. 122 A local school district may receive Title I funds only if it uses state and
local funds to provide services to Title I schools that are, when taken as a whole, at
least comparable to the services that are provided in schools that are not receiving
Title I funds. 123 If the local school district gives all of its schools Title I funds, that
district must use state and local funds to provide services that, taken as a whole, are
substantially comparable in each Title I school. I24
Local school districts meet the comparability requirement by filing a written
assurance with the appropriate state body informing the body that it has that it has
established and implemented the following: (1) a district-wide salary schedule; (2)
a policy to ensure equivalence among schools in teachers, administrators, and other
staff; and (3) "a policy to ensure equivalence among schools in the provision of
curriculum materials and instructional supplies."125 A school district may also meet
the comparability requirement by establishing and implementing other measures for
determining compliance. 126 The most common way to demonstrate comparability is
through staff/student ratio or salary/student ratio. 127
The principal reason for the comparability requirements is ensuring that states
are not using federal funds to fill ordinary budgetary gaps.128 If left unrestrained,

120. [d. at 803.
121. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, 20 U.S.c. § 6321(c) (2002).
122. [d. § 6321 (c)(l)(A).
123. [d.
124. [d. § 6321(c)(I)(B).
125. [d. § 6321(c)(2)(A).
126. See id. § 6312(c)(1)(M) (allowing the use of other measures for determining student academic
assessment).
127. Each local educational agency (LEA) must develop procedures for complying with the
comparability requirements. 20 U.S.c. § 6321(c)(3)(A). The compliance plan should be in writing and
include: a timeline for demonstrating comparability; identification of the office responsible for making
comparability calculations, the measure and process used to determine whether schools are comparable;
and how and when the LEA makes adjustments in schools that are not comparable. [d. § 6314(b)(2). The
LEA must maintain documentation to support the calculations, and documentation to demonstrate that
any needed adjustments to staff assignments are made. [d. § 6321(c)(3)(b).
128. Ctr. for Am. Progress Report, supra note 24, at 13-14.
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local and state school districts might substitute federal funds for state and local
funds throughout the school district and thus reallocate resources away from Title I
eligible students. 129
The comparability requirement is evaluated at the school level because it seeks
to weigh the services provided in Title I schools with those provided in non-Title I
schools. To ensure that states recognize their fiscal partnership with the federal
government, states are required to maintain ninety percent of its aggregate state and
local funding for the previous year as a condition of receiving the Title I money.130
Another fiscal requirement of Title I is the "supplement not supplant"
provision. 131 Federal and state officials admit that the current "supplement not
supplant" provisions are difficult to understand and apply.132 The "'supplement not
supplant' provision" is applied differently depending on how Title I services are
applied. 133 It is applied directly to the program, or the student in targeted assistance
programs, to ensure that more services are being provided for a Title I child than
non-Title I child; or it is applied to the school if it operates a school-wide
program.134 The most important consideration is that school districts prioritize the
use of the federal funds within the local school area so that schools with the highest
concentrations of poverty receive appropriate funding. 135
As the use of Title I funding has evolved and Congress has created more
flexibility in the way that program funds are used, an unintended consequence has
been inadequate monitoring of state and local use of funds. This problem is
alleviated whenever the funds are used for targeted assistance programs. 136 When
Title I funds are used not for targeted assistance, but instead for school-wide
programs, Title I money can be combined with other funds. 137 The difficulty with
this particular rule is two-fold. First, it is difficult to determine if the local school
district would have allocated the funds it uses for the Title I program if the federal
funds were not available. us Second, in school wide programs where federal, state,

129. See id. at 14 (providing example of a former racially segregated school district that used Title I
funds for significant physical improvements to predominantly black schools, but used local funds for the
same improvements in predominantly white schools).
130. 20 U.S.c. § 6332(c)(I)(B).
131. [d. § 6321(b)(I).
132. [d. § 649(a)(2)(A).
133. See id. § 6321(b) ("A State educational agency or local education agency shall use Federal funds
received under this part only to supplement the funds that would, in the absence of Federal funds, be
made available from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in programs assisted
under this party, and not to supplant such funds.").
134. [d. § 6303(c).
135. [d.
136. Targeted funds and services are when Title I funds are used specifically for teachers and
materials to use for students who meet the Title I eligibility guidelines. [d. § 6315(a).
137. According to the GAO Report from 2002, before NCLB was passed, schools could operate
school-wide programs using a combination of Title I and other funds if seventy-five percent or more of
their student population was Title I eligible. GAO TITLE I FuNDING, supra note 26, at 9. NCLB has
lowered that threshold to forty percent or more. 20 U.S.c. § 6314(a).
138. The GAO study found that school districts have a lot of flexibility in the use of Title I funds
received and also noted the use over half of the districts reserved some portion of their Title I funds for
administration or other district activities. GAO TITLE I FuNDING, supra note 26, at 19-21.
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and local funds are pooled or where district-wide school reforms have been
implemented and programs have changed from year to year, it is difficult to
compare funding.139 Moreover, it is unclear whether school districts are thoroughly
familiar with these limitations. 140
It is ironic that comparability and "supplement not supplant" are intended to
serve as fiscal accountability provisions for Title I funding, because neither works
effectively. Both provisions are intended to limit the extent to which grantees can
use federal funds to replace their own funds. Yet, one of the key findings of the
GAO Report was that both the monitoring guidelines and actual practices are so
poor that school districts misinterpreted that there were separate requirements that
should be both monitored, and reported being in compliance with both
requirements even if they were only monitoring and auditing one of them.141 The
auditing and monitoring functions must be greatly enhanced so that there can be
fiscal balance.
III. THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION FuNDING
From their beginnings, Title I and ESEA embodied a political struggle over
federalism. The struggle for control in this context is the basic one faced over and
over in our democracy on so many issues: namely, whether decisions about
education should be made at the state or federal level.
A. Cooperative Federalism

In the United States, we have a federalist system of shared government. The
Founding Fathers envisioned several benefits to the division of political power.
Federalism balances political power in our country.142 To maintain this balance,
Congress must only act within its delineated powers, thereby refraining from
encroachment on the areas under the control of the states. The compromise position
for this is cooperative federalism. Cooperative federalism is a system of shared
governance in which national, state, and local governments interact cooperatively
and collectively to solve common problems. 143 It is efficient because, rather than
making policies separately, state and local governments take the lead from the
federal government on the particular project.
The federal approach to education funding embraces cooperative federalism
by making funds available to local school districts which then choose how to spend

139. NCLB does not require schools using Title I funds for school-wide programs to maintain
records identifying the each fund is used. 20 U.S.c. § 6314(a)(3)(C).
140. The GAO study found that in the states reviewed for compliance with the supplement
requirements there was limited program monitoring covering only a portion of local education agencies
in any given year. GAO TITLE I FuNDING, supra note 26, at 19.
14\. Id. at 19.
142. Leonardo Rago, National Constitutional Center, A Founding Father's Dictionary, in FEDERAL
EMPLOYEE'S TOOLKIT 5, 6 (2005), available at http://constitutioncenter.orglFiles/fed_toolkit.pdf.
143. Philip I. Weisner, Cooperative Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REv.
727,728-29 (2003).
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them.l44 Title I funding was conceived as a program of cooperative federalism. It
represents comprehensive federal educational funding with overarching federal
policies and objectives rather than specific mandates and goals. 145 With students as
the recipients of the federal funds, state and local school districts serve either as
conduits or barriers to the receipt of those funds. 146
A cooperative federalism program, admittedly, is an attempt at nationalization
of the subject area. Yet, the choice of the Congressional directive in distributing the
funds affects the effectiveness of the program. If Congress chooses to deliver the
nationalized program by providing significant funds, there are mandatory
regulations that recipients must follow or risk losing that federal funding. 147
Cooperative federalism has been roundly criticized because federal funding
often separates program design from its implementation. 148 To the extent that states
are given the freedom to implement national programs and objectives, even when
there is prior approval of the state's plan as in the case of Title I, there is an
inherent inconsistency and incoherence in the interpretation of the federal
objectives. 149 Whether there can even be administrative effectiveness and how it
can be achieved is an issue worthy of consideration. 150
In cooperative federalism, there is a delicate balance between supporting the
state and local government and federal preemption over state and local matters. It is
indisputable that education plays a critical function in our country. In some
respects, the real question is whether education preparedness is a national issue.
Although Title I's ideology was born of compromise, its present configuration
clearly gives states a non-negotiable posture that they must adopt or refuse all
funding. 151 While the localism argument often pins its rationale on states as
laboratories for experimentation, a close examination of the present statutory
requirements indicates that that little if any of the flexibility and competition that
are expected under that principle have been preserved under NCLB: centralized
education policy.
A searching analysis reveals that although NCLB mandates that states develop
their own education plans, those plans are effectively governed at the federal level
by the statute's requirements and penalties. The states's policy choices are actually
governed by the receipt of federal dollars. It is apparent that the level of federal

144. See Nina J. Crimm, Core Societal Values Deserve Federal Aid: Schools, Tax Credits, and the
Establishment Clause, 34 GA. L. REV. 1,47 (1999) (discussing framework of Title I funding).
145. GAO TITLE I fuNDING, supra note 25, at 4-5.
146. Zamora, supra note 40, at 426.
147. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (discussing constitutionality of
requirements for states accepting federal monies).
148. MICHAEL S. GREVE, BIG GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM 2 (2001), available at http://federalismpr
oject.org/depositorylFederalistOutI00k5.pdf.
149. [d. at 3 ("Cooperative programs and expenditures roughly tripled between 1960 and 1980.").
ISO. "Cooperative federalism thereby undermines political accountability. In the end, 'no one is truly
responsible,' and 'everyone is responsible for everything.'" [d. at 2 (quoting ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMICS OF
GROWTH, AN AGENDA FOR AMERICAN FEDERALISM: RESTORING COMPETENCE AND CONFIDENCE 95
(1981), available at http://www.library.unt.eduIgpo/acirIReports/policy/a-86.pdf).
lSI. See McDonnell, supra note 62, at 21-22 (discussing the nature of federal conditional spending).

Fall 2009]

FUNNY MONEY

141

education funding authorized under ESEA is consistent with the New Deal
legislation which sought to unify the nation though uniform and reciprocal laws
and regulations. 152 Cooperative federalism can allow states to take less initiative
and responsibility for the particular program. If the state only complies with the
federal program guidelines, that state gives up its interest or claim over the subject
matter. As a result, the state's interest is subsumed by the federal government.
To ensure the success of NCLB, the federally funded program must become
more transparent and accountable. Exercising the shared responsibility in a way
that is conducive to the proper fund allocation and monitoring by the federal
government is the only way to preserve elementary and secondary education as a
non-federal issue.
IV. EDUCATION FuNDING AND FEDERALISM
The federal government's role in education has evolved from the Founding
Fathers' insistence that the states provide free, public education to the present
standards-based movement that NCLB represents. Examination of this history is
critical to understanding how federal policy through federal funding has come to
dominate state and local control over education.
A. The Gradual Increase of the Federal Role in Education

Exclusive state authority over public education was unchallenged prior to the
New Deal era. 153 The federal government historically exercised no jurisdiction in
that area. 154 One interpretation of the Constitution limits Congressional authority to
only its enumerated powers. The rationale behind this line of thought is that the
Tenth Amendment barred legislation regarding public education because it was not
an enumerated power.155 What the Framers made clear, however, was that an
educated citizenry is vital for a democratic society and that the states ought to fund
such a function. 156
The "New Deal Supreme Court" found adequate justification for the federal
government to legislate in areas traditionally left to the states. 157 This had the
concomitant effect of allowing more federal involvement in public education.
While the initial involvement was slow, a series of national events served as an

152. Scheiber, supra note 38, at 254-55.
153. Emily Barbour, Note, Separate and Invisible: Alternative Education Programs and Our
Educational Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV. 197,208-210 (2009) (discussing the federal government's role in
requiring states to create and maintain public education systems during the nation's early years).
154. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) ("No single tradition in public education is
more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools.").
155. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
156. See Thomas Jefferson, Panel Three on The Jefferson Memorial, http://www.monticello.org/re
ports!quotes!memorial.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) ("Establish a law for educating the common
people. This it is the business of the state and on a general plan.").
157. See Scheiber, supra note 38, at 258-59 (describing the New Deal's expansion of federal powers
including agriculture, welfare, and social security).
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impetus for a national movement of educational equity and excellence. 15s
B. The Modem Federal Role in Education Funding

The role that government should play in education funding was squarely faced
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.'59 That case involved
claims of inequitable funding and challenged the practice of relying on property
taxes for school financing. '60 The Supreme Court determined that there is no right
to education and denied the plaintiffs the requested relief for unequal education
opportunities. 161
The Court's reasoning was premised on the limits of its enforcement over state
and local governments on issues involving non-fundamental rights. '62 The Court
acknowledged the scope of the problem by indicating that uniformity in funding
and other educational reforms should come from the legislative branch. 163
Expansive oversight under NCLB seems like the type of legislative action the
Court was referring to in Rodriguez. In this regard, NCLB is consistent with ESEA,
as its intent is to equalize educational funding. It seems obvious Congress has given
the U.S. Department of Education the authority to enforce Title I, but the
Department has chosen not to conduct the necessary audits or look more closely at
audit systems that do not work properly. The lack of adequate enforcement by the
U.S. Department of Education of Title I requirements has hindered appropriate
implementation. '64 One possible, although hardly justifiable, explanation regarding
lax enforcement is that the Department of Education now has a culture of nonenforcement. 165 The history of weak enforcement which began with Congress's
inadequate delegation of enforcement authority to the agency, has created a pattern
and practice of non-enforcement of violations. 166
ESEA's contorted history and weak initial implementation have contributed
greatly to ineffective enforcement and inequitable funding. The comparability
provision extends beyond the use of federal dollars by forcing equitable
distributions of state and local funds before federal funds are added to school
budgets. '67 Federal lawmakers wanted to ensure that Title I-eligible children and

158. See Judith A. Winston, Achieving Excellence and Equal Opportunity in Education: No Conflict
of Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 997, 1002-03 (2001) (discussing the effect of Russia's launching of the
satellite Sputnik on mathematics and science education in the U.S.); see also Robert B. Keiter, Judicial
Review Of Student First Amendment Claims: Assessing The Legitimacy-Competency Debate, 50 Mo. L.
REv. 25, 57 (1985) (discussing the role of the federal government in desegregating public schools
following the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown).
159. 411 U.S. I (1973).
160. [d. at 4-16.
161. [d. at 38-39.
162. [d. at 40-41.
163. [d. at 54-55.
164. McDonnell, supra note 62, at 23.
165. See Cohen & Moffitt, supra note 49, at 89 (discussing the Department of Education's need for
political support from localities and states and its effects on enforcement).
166. See McDonnell, supra note 62, at 23 (discussing early powers of what became the U.S.
Department of Education).
167. [d.
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eligible schools received better teachers, smaller classes, more instructional time, or
supplementary programs that were not generally available in the district as a whole
without losing out on the standard services provided to all students in the district
funding outcomes. 168
These difficulties lead to ineffective enforcement and continued failure to
comply with the statutory mandate. The GAO finding that the Department of
Education does not properly monitor the accountability and assessment
requirements of Title I showed a critical flaw in the statute's efficacy.169 The
investigation also revealed that lax enforcement by the Department of Education
has resulted in failing to institute enforcement actions when appropriate. 170 The
report recommended additional training for the audit and oversight roles by the
states and encouraged a heightened level of attention given to fiscal requirements in
their monitoring efforts. 171
It is noteworthy that Title I began as "follow the child" funding, so the
delivery of the funds determine the statute's efficacy. The delivery of the funds also
showed the extent of compromise at the heart of the legislation. The local school
district served as a "public trustee" and the funds could go to the public or private
school that the child attended.172 Now, as in the past, the federal government makes
Title I awards to state departments of education. 173 Local school districts receive
federal funds after submitting a program application that details how the funds will
be allocated within the school district. 174 The awards are made based on a
calculation that includes the number of children from high-poverty families that
reside in the local district. 175 There is one other mandate worth noting: Title I funds
were to "supplement, not supplant" the state funds spent on economically
disadvantaged children. 176 Yet, "Title I funds were to be used in any manner
approved by the State as long as it was spent on 'educationally deprived' children
in public school areas that served at least some low-income students."177
V. ENSURING FuNDING EQUITY

The current funding system is inadequate because it directs money to those
children who do not need help and fails to direct the appropriate amount of money
to those children who do need help. Provisions that will ensure greater fiscal equity
and more investments in minority and high-poverty schools must be strengthened.
A "funding the child" approach changes the impetus of state and local schools
and actually encourages minority and high-poverty student enrollment, because the
168. [d. at 20-21.
169. See GAO TITLE I FuNDING, supra note 25, at 7-10 (discussing the different oversight processes
available to the Department of Education).
170. [d. at 15-16.
17l. [d. at 26.
172. Zamora, supra note 40, at 425.
173. /d.
174. [d.
175. [d. at 425-26.
176. [d. at 426.
177. [d.
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child brings additional financial resources. This approach also creates incentives for
schools to attract and educate students from all backgrounds, not just the well-todo. Such a system, based on these principles, would be fairer than the current
system because it would ensure that the underserved child receives the intended
funds.'7 B
A. Comparability as Disguised Deregulation

Equity was the essential function of the comparability requirement. 179
Congress recognized soon after passage of the original Title I legislation that the
"supplemental" federal help would not be effective unless "the program came with
a comparability requirement that stipulated that school districts must equalize
educational services purchased with state and local funds before Title I funds are
brought into the miX."IBO
Three statutory loopholes exist: teacher salary, funding equivalences, and
waivers. Because of these loopholes and a generally lax enforcement mechanism,
the statute's purpose and effectiveness are often thwarted.
1. Teacher Equivalence
As originally enacted, Title I viewed instruction as significant. The law
"required equivalence with regard to student-staff ratios and per-pupil instructional
staff expenditures ... ."IBl Specifically, school districts must ensure that there is
equivalence with respect to "teachers, administrators, and other staff' between Title

17S. See THOMAS B. FORDHAM INSTITUTE, FUND THE CHILD: TACKLING INEQUITY & ANTIQUITY IN
SCHOOL FINANCE 3 (2006), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/mediaIFordha
m_FundtheChild.pdf (providing an in-depth discussion of a "fund the child" approach). This approach is
beyond the scope of this Article. This approach is desirable because it provides equal educational
opportunity based on the following principles:
I. Funding should follow the child, on a per-student basis, to the public school that he/she
attends.
2. Per-student funding should vary according to the child's need and other relevant
circumstances.
3. It should arrive at the school as real dollars (i.e., not teaching positions, ratios, or staffing
norms) that can be spent flexibly, with accountability systems focused more on results and
less on inputs, programs, or activities.
4. These principles for allocating money to schools should apply to all levels (e.g., federal
funds going to states, state funds going to districts, districts to schools).
5. Funding systems should be simplified and made transparent.

Id.
179. Ross Wiener, Strengthening Comparability Advancing Equity in Public Education, in ENSURING
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION How loCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT PRACTICES HURT
DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND WHAT FEDERAL POLICY CAN Do ABOUT IT 33, 35 (200S), available
at http://www.americanprogress.orglissuesl200S/06/pdf/comparability.pdf.
ISO. Roza, supra note 23, at 61.
lSI. Wiener, supra note 179, at 3S (emphasis in original). Originally, comparability "required equal
pupil-teacher ratios in terms of certified teachers, other certified staff, and non-certified staff. It also
required equal expenditures on instructional staff salaries (other than longevity pay) and other
instructional costs." Id. at 37.
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I and non-Title I schools.182 This was done by requiring the Title I school to have a
Title I teacher equivalence schedule. 183
Title I no longer requires school districts to individually assess and determine
comparability. Instead, the law allows school districts to count paraprofessionals
and teachers for instructional purpose and to ignore differences in teacher salaries
across schools. l84 Both of these authorized actions have the effect of undermining
the statute's purpose of providing high quality instruction to economicallydisadvantaged children. Because semi-professionals are regarded as having the
same amount of expertise as college-trained teachers and because the intra-district
salary differentials are not segregated, the entire school district's Title I salary ratio
can be inflated. The benefit to the school district in by doing this is that more Title I
funds can be diverted from the classroom and used for other program expenditures.
The result is a decrease in the amount of Title I money spent on teacher instruction
which "mask[s] the potentially harmful inequities in access to qualified
teachers."185 More Title I funds can be diverted from instructional costs and used
for other program expenditures. 186
2. 90 Percent Fiscal Equity

Title I does not require full fiscal equity. School districts can comply by
providing comparable funding when the funding for Title I students reaches ninety
percent of the expenditures for non-Title I students. 187 In addition, the provision
limits the amount of additional state and local funds that can be provided to highpoverty, Title I schools to no more than ten percent more than the amount provided
to non-Title I schools. 188 This means that Title I schools that have significantly
smaller class sizes may be out of compliance because average expenditures are too
high, although the quality of instruction may be considered necessary.189 School
district inefficacies in distinguishing between targeted and non-targeted funds can
result in high-poverty schools not receiving the appropriate amount of funding
while subsidizing low-poverty schools.190
3. Waivers
The present interpretation of comparability by the Department of Education
allows waivers.191 Comparability waivers are, however, inapposite to the statutory
scheme. 192 The conditions in the state educational programs do not justify

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

[d. at 38.
[d.
[d. at 35, 38.
[d. at 38.

Wiener, supra note 179, at 37, 39.
[d. at 39.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 40.

191. See McClure, supra note 50, at 26 (discussing the Department of Education's granting of a
waiver requested by the San Diego Unified School District).
192. See id. ("Here we have the ultimate irony .... The state actually acts to enforce the law. And
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abandoning, temporarily waiving, or weakening the congressional intent and
mandate for school comparability as a condition precedent to receipt of federal
Title I education funding. The comparability waivers in effect supplant state funds
without ever improving the educational conditions of poor students.
The waiver policy allows for failure to help very high-poverty students, who
are the intended beneficiaries of federal funds. It is unclear how, if waivers are
granted, the lost educational opportunities will be recouped. This is an especially
critical point because waivers apply across the board and are available to school
districts regardless of the student outcome under NCLB.193
The law on comparability has lost most of its effectiveness due to lax
enforcement. l94 School districts certify comparability by giving a biennial
assurance to the state departments of education that Title I's requirements are being
met. 195 There is no ongoing program oversight and no intervention if federal funds
are mis-allocated after the funds have been spent. 196 What is actually a program of
conditional funding is implemented as though it is a discretionary program. Again,
the ideological compromises that surround Title I affect the program's discipline.
Allowing states to decide not just the education plans but whether those plans are in
compliance with the Title I guidelines undercuts the statute's effectiveness and
makes compliance with the statute voluntary. What is worse, compliance is subject
to pressure from interest groups or budgetary crises within the local school district
or state. Also, no remedies are available until after the money has been spent.
The U.S. Department of Education, as the federal agency with jurisdiction
over the process, must exercise more authority over the use of the Title I funds.
Otherwise, the system of assessment contained in NCLB lacks a solid enforcement
foundation.

the federal government, the supposed guarantor of Title I as a categorical program, waives comparability
and Supplement/Not Supplant regulations.").
193. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE STATE FISCAL STABILIZATION FuND PROGRAM 9
(2009), available at http://www.ed.gov/programs/statestabilizationlguidance.pdf (discussing the Obama
Administration's adoption of the following core principles: "making improvements in teacher
effectiveness and in the equitable distribution of qualified teachers for all students, particularly students
who are most in need; ... (3) making progress toward rigorous college- and career-ready standards and
high-quality assessments that are valid and reliable for all students, including limited English proficient
students and students with disabilities; and (4) providing targeted, intensive support and effective
interventions for the lowest-performing schools. ").
194. Wiener, supra note 179, at 34.
195. [d. at 39.
196. [d.
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CONCLUSION

Our Nation's public school system is highly decentralized. Yet, more than
ever, it is clear that education must be a national priority. Federal funding for
education makes a cooperative federalism program in which the state and federal
government share responsibility for the program design and policy objectives. This
arrangement is a beneficial one. The benefits of strong federal funding for
education will yield a more informed citizenry, and a better educated and more
skilled workforce, making our country more competitive in an increasingly
connected world. Although expenditures for education comprise a significant
amount of federal dollars, Congress has consistently chosen not to provide strong
commitments, completely fund the Nation's educational systems, or declare a right
to education. Unfortunately, the costs of these deficiencies will be borne by the
country as a whole.
Moreover, the current federal funding system as applied in most states is
deeply inequitable and fails to direct funding so as to serve economically
challenged populations. Fiscal accountability measures should be strengthened so
that the fundamental flaws in the current school finance system make it impossible
for the system to provide a maximum return on investment. The statute and
implementing regulations should redefine the criteria used to measure
comparability and the supplementation requirements. A guarantee of equal
educational opportunity is not only what every child deserves, it is what America
deserves.

